People often choose intuitive rather than equally valid nonintuitive alternatives. The authors suggest that these intuitive biases arise because intuitions often spring to mind with subjective ease, and the subjective ease leads people to hold their intuitions with high confidence. An investigation of predictions against point spreads found that people predicted intuitive options more often than equally valid nonintuitive alternatives. Critically, though, this effect was largely determined by people's confidence in their intuitions. Across naturalistic, expert, and laboratory samples, against personally (...) determined point spreads, and even when intuitive confidence was manipulated by altering irrelevant aspects of the decision context, the authors found that decreasing intuitive confidence reduced or eliminated intuitive biases. These findings indicate that intuitive biases are not inevitable but rather predictably determined by contextual variables that affect intuitive confidence. (shrink)

In Socrates among Strangers, Joseph P. Lawrence reclaims the enigmatic sage from those who have seen him either as a prophet of science, seeking the security of knowledge, or as a wily actor who shed light on the dangerous world of politics while maintaining a prudent distance from it. The Socrates Lawrence seeks is the imprudent one, the man who knew how to die. The institutionalization of philosophy in the modern world has come at the cost of its most (...) vital concern: the achievement of life wisdom. Those who have ceased to grow (those who think they know) close their ears to the wisdom of strangers—and Socrates, who stood face to face with death, is the archetypal stranger. His avowal of ignorance, Lawrence suggests, is more needed than ever in an age defined by technical mastery and expert knowledge. (shrink)

Neil Levy offers the most prominent moral principles that are specifically and exclusively designed to apply to neuroethics. His two closely related principles, labeled as versions of the ethical parity principle , are intended to resolve moral concerns about neurological modification and enhancement [1]. Though EPP is appealing and potentially illuminating, we reject the first version and substantially modify the second. Since his first principle, called EPP , is dependent on the contention that the mind literally extends into external props (...) such as paper notebooks and electronic devices, we begin with an examination of the extended mind hypothesis and its use in Levy’s EPP . We argue against reliance on EMH as support for EPP . We turn to his second principle, EPP , which is not dependent on EMH but is tied to the acceptable claim that the mind is embedded in, because dependent on, external props. As a result of our critique of EPP , we develop a modified version of EPP , which we argue is more acceptable than Levy’s principle. Finally, we evaluate the applicability of our version of EPP. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants should show bold moral courage in discharging their duties to patients, families, and healthcare providers. Given the corrosive impact on trust, and on the appropriate d...

This project explores the ethical obligations of food journalists. Using history, normative, and feminist theory, I argue that if specific media is going to be considered food journalism, then we should be able to identify its service to citizens. This project thus seeks a unified view for evaluating the democratic and caring potential of food journalism. I outline some of the contours of quality food journalism – its principles, practices and forms – through both historical and contemporary examples. I show (...) how both sets of food journalists adhere(d) to traditional notions of democracy-serving communication while also employing a more situated ethic of care. Ultimately, I argue that quality food journalists should adopt this care ethic addressing citizen-eaters, as this nourishes the relationships necessary for democratic worldmaking and gives us the best opportunity of collectively eating and living well. (shrink)

Lukas J. Meier et al. offer the promise of a pathway for resolving clinical bioethical problems using an artificial intelligence interface. The ultimate goal, we assume, is...

Self-confidence is associated with many positive outcomes, and training programs routinely seek to build participants’ self-efficacy. In this article, however, we consider whether self-confidence increases unethical behavior. In a series of studies, we explore the relationship between negotiator self-efficacy—an individual’s confidence in his or her negotiation ability—and the use of deception. We find that individuals high in negotiator self-efficacy are more likely to use deception than individuals low in negotiator self-efficacy. We also find that perceptions of the risk of deception (...) mediate this relationship. By identifying negotiator self-efficacy as an antecedent to unethical behavior, our findings offer important theoretical and empirical insights into the use of deception, the role of individual differences in ethical decision making, and the broader consequences of self-confidence in business and society. (shrink)

According to agent-based approaches to virtue ethics, the rightness of an action is a function of the motives which prompted that action. If those motives were morally praiseworthy, then the action was right; if they were morally blameworthy, the action was wrong. Many critics find this approach problematically insensitive to an act’s consequences, and claim that agent-basing fails to preserve the intuitive distinction between agent- and act-evaluation. In this article I show how an agent-based account of right action can be (...) made sensitive to an act’s consequences. According to the approach which I defend, an action is right just in case it realizes an agent’s morally praiseworthy motive. Conversely, an action is wrong just in case it realizes a morally blameworthy motive. Specifying act-evaluation in terms of the realization, rather than the expression, of an agent’s motives allows an agent-based approach to distinguish between agent- and act-evaluation. This is because an agent may act from a morally praiseworthy motive, but fail to realize that motive. Her action will therefore not have been the right one, despite its being the expression of morally praiseworthy motives. (shrink)

The philosophy of Schelling has for too long been lost in the shadows of Fichte and Hegel. While one might dispute Martin Heidegger’s judgment that Schelling was actually the most creative and far-reaching thinker of German Idealism, it betrays both ignorance and intellectual indolence to simply deny his importance. Schelling was not only a significant co-author of “Hegelian” idealism, he was also its first and perhaps most penetrating critic. He outlived Hegel by over 20 years and, as Manfred Frank demonstrates (...) in one of the following essays, developed the arguments against Hegel that were subsequently taken up by Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard. (shrink)

Prior studies report that the business group structure and the associated intra-group capital flows are prone to conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority investors. Yet business group is a prevalent and stable structure around the globe, particularly where capital markets are underdeveloped. Using data from China, this paper empirically studies the trade-off between the negative and positive roles played by intra-group capital flows and tests the efficiency implications of such trade-off. We find that from the perspective of the (...) whole group, intra-group capital flows are most efficient when the groups are least subject to conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and when they face strong external financing constraints. (shrink)

Susan D. McCammon and Nicole M. Piemonte offer a thoughtful and thorough commentary on our manuscript entitled “Expanding the use of Continuous Sedation Until Death.” In this reply we attempt to clarify and further defend our position. We show how continuous sedation until death is not a “first resort” but rather a legitimate option among many that should available to terminally ill patients whose life expectancy is less than six months. We also attempt to show that we do not equivocate (...) the meaning of palliative care as the commentators suggested. We argue that the traditional notion of palliative care should move beyond relief of “experienced suffering” to relief of potential suffering for those whose life expectancy is less than six months. Lastly, we challenge the commentator’s position that the realm of ordinary medicine” should be the guide to care, by showing how the notion of ordinary medicine has been successfully challenged in both bioethical scholarship and the courts in a way that shows ordinary medicine to be an evolving concept rather than a static, universal guide. (shrink)

If Lewis prefers the political Plato to the apolitical Socrates, I take my stand with Socrates. I also regard Plato as having been more profoundly invested in establishing a philosophical religion than in establishing a philosophical politics. Cultivating trust in the Good is ultimately of more importance than arming a state against potential enemies. Courage is a virtue greater than prudence. Plato’s Laws, on my reading, is less concerned with maintaining the order of the state than with civilizing its inhabitants. (...) In light of this contention, I understand Plato as being more Socratic—more open to question and thus more flexible—than Lewis’s reading seems to allow. This is why I think Plato provides more attention to his extended preambles to the laws than to the laws themselves. As seriously as Plato took the quest for true law, he realized that any positive code of law has to be subject to constant revision. (shrink)

This paper explores Schelling's life-long fascination with Spinoza. Through moments of ambivalence and enthusiasm, one aspect of the latter's thought remains central for Schelling: the intellectual intuition of God/Nature. While he consistently emphasizes the non-objectifiable nature of the intuition (as constituting the ground of freedom), the influence of Spinoza is still apparent in what Schelling calls the Ullvordellklichkeit des Seills. Freedom is a response to an ungroundable necessity that consciousness lives out of, but behind which it can never penetrate. This (...) insight provokes a reading of Spinoza that departs from the conventional rationalist interpretation and gestures to an a-theological, yet mystical, understanding, which awakens a feeling not only for the sublime in nature, but for the sublime that lies at "the heart of what is." In the ensuing silence of the self, substance reveals itself as living spirit. Through this interpretation, the Neoplatonic truth of Spinoza becomes visible. (shrink)

O rzeczywistym wpływie Dostojewskiego na Kafkę można mówić jedynie w przypadku powieści: Die Verwandlung, Der Prozeß i Der Bau. Studia porównawcze sprowadzają się jednakże najczęściej do badania poszczególnych motywów. Niniejszy szkic podejmuje próbę bardziej wnikliwego omówienia owych wpływów, a przedstawione fakty zdają się potwierdzać jednoznacznie duchowe powinowactwo Kafki i Dostojewskiego.

Part 1: What is philosophy? Introduction -- A brief history of philosophy -- Part II: The evolution of philosophy. Reason -- Sense experience -- Reason, sense, and intuition -- Self-preservation/power -- Desire/Free will -- Science -- Language -- Additional human activities -- Philosophy : the lessons learned -- Part III: The philosophy of conscious energy. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) -- The philosophy of conscious energy -- Comments.

Moral distress has been the subject of extensive research and debate in the nursing ethics literature since the mid-1980s, but the concept has received comparatively little attention from those working outside of applied ethics. In this article, I defend a care ethical account of moral distress, according to which the phenomenon is the product of an agent’s inability to live up to one of her caring commitments. This account has a number of attractions. First, it places a greater emphasis on (...) the importance of the relationship between the caregiver and her cared-for than that found in previous accounts. Second, it does not make problematic assumptions about the correctness of a caregiver’s moral judgments, as has been claimed in relation to previous accounts of moral distress. Finally, my account allows for a clear conceptual distinction to be drawn between moral distress and other forms of negative moral emotion such as guilt and regret. Earlier accounts draw this distinction by appealing to the causal aetiology of moral distress, but as I show here, such appeals are ultimately unsuccessful unless they are made from an explicitly care ethical starting point. One of the implications of my account is that moral distress has the potential to occur in the context of any caregiving relationship. This claim is explored in the final section of the paper, in relation to student-teacher and parent-child caregiving. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that care ethics should be understood as a form of value pluralism. Writers on the ethics of care tend not explicitly to address issues in the theory of value, although much of what has been written about care ethics may be taken to suggest that it endorses some form of value monism. I argue against this conception of care ethics by showing that the practical reality of caregiving is more accurately represented by a pluralist account (...) of value. Practices of care are plausibly guided by a number of distinct and potentially conflicting values. These include quality of life, autonomy, dignity, personal development, and the value of nurturant relationships. Whilst caring takes each of these values to be important in its own right, they are not always jointly realisable, and carers are sometimes forced to promote one such value at the expense of another. The possibility of conflict between values is, of course, precisely what a pluralist conception of value tells us to expect. In this respect, then, value pluralism more faithfully reflects the reality of caregiving than does value monism, and care ethicists ought for this reason to endorse it. (shrink)

The increasing life expectancy of terminally-ill people has raised many public policy concerns about end-of-life care. Due to increased longevity and the lack of cures for illnesses like cancer and heart disease, palliative care, particularly pain management, has become an important mode OF medical therapy. Palliative care providers feel that “[h]ealth care professionals have a moral duty to provide adequate palliative care and pain relief, even if such care shortens the patient’s life.” Practitioners of forensic medicine grapple with determining when (...) to classify the death of a person formerly receiving palliative care as a non-natural death. Such classification may be paramount in the enforcement of new statutes that aim at preventing assisted suicide or monitoring the quality of health care, but it potentially places forensic medicine and palliative medicine in adversarial roles. (shrink)

As currently practiced, the use of continuous sedation until death (CSD) is controlled by clinicians in a way that may deny patients a key choice in controlling their dying process. Ethical guidelines from the American Medical Association and the American Academy of Pain Medicine describe CSD as a “last resort,” and a position statement from the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine describe it as “an intervention reserved for extreme situations.” Accordingly, patients must progress to unremitting pain and suffering (...) and reach a last-resort stage before the option to pursue CSD is considered. Alternatively, we present and defend a new guideline in which decisionally capable, terminally ill patients who have a life expectancy of less than six months may request CSD before being subjected to the refractory suffering of a treatment of “last resort.”. (shrink)

Environmental philosophers tend to be particularly wary of the language of “transcendence.” From Heidegger to contemporary feminism, we find the idea that the failure to respect nature is grounded in Platonism and Abrahamic religion. The denial of earth began, we are told, with the separation of the intelligible form from the actual thing, or, even worse, of the creator from the created. From this point of view what we need is a restored pantheistic sense, a new and revitalized paganism. I (...) counter this assertion by a reading of Plato’s Phaedrus that shows that respect itself is grounded in the recognition of transcendence. With the Bookof Job, I maintain that the voice of the transcendent God is what enables Job not only to see past his sufferings but for the first time to encounter the beauty of nature. Overcoming anthropocentrism requires a relationship to transcendence as such. (shrink)

The goal of this study was to assess the relationships between computational approaches to analyzing constructed responses made during reading and individual differences in the foundational skills of reading in college readers. We also explored if these relationships were consistent across texts and samples collected at different institutions and texts. The study made use of archival data that involved college participants who produced typed constructed responses under thinking aloud instructions reading history and science texts. They also took assessments of vocabulary (...) knowledge and proficiency in comprehension. The protocols were analyzed to assess two different ways to determine their cohesion. One approach involved assessing how readers established connections with themselves. The other approach involved assessing connections between the constructed responses and the texts that were read. Additionally, the comparisons were made by assessing both lexical and semantic comparisons. The result showed that both approaches for analyzing cohesion and making the comparisons were correlated with vocabulary knowledge and comprehension proficiency. The implications of the results for theory and practice are discussed. (shrink)

Deception is pervasive in negotiations and organizations, and emotions are critical to using, detecting, and responding to deception. In this article, we introduce a theoretical model to explore the interplay between emotional intelligence (the ability to perceive and express, understand, regulate, and use emotions) and deception in negotiations. In our model, we propose that emotional intelligence influences the decision to use deception, the effectiveness of deception, the ability to detect deception, and the consequences of deception (specifically, trust repair and retaliation). (...) We consider the emotional intelligence of both deceivers and targets, and we consider characteristics of negotiators, their interaction, and the negotiation context that moderate these relationships. Our model offers a theoretical foundation for research on emotions, emotional intelligence, and deception and identifies a potential disadvantage of negotiating with an emotionally intelligent counterpart. Though prior work has focused on the advantages of being and interacting with people high in emotional intelligence, we assert that those most likely to deceive us may also be those highest in emotional intelligence. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive introduction to the many ethical and legal issues that arise in the practice of nursing. Ethical analysis is supplemented with the rigorous discussion of precedents from the American legal system as well as the requirements of professional codes operating at the national and state levels. Topics include informed consent, end-of-life treatment, impaired decisional capacity, privacy and confidentiality, and much more.